Abstrict

The concept of intelligence cooperation and national security is not new, particularly after realism which interpreted these concepts with different perspectives. International states are sovereign, and they got the capacity to secure themselves from internal and external threats, i.e., army is a key to state security as it can attack the enemy to protect its borders. States are not all the time's hostiles, but after 9/11, the concept of national security with refers to intelligence cooperation is a highly debatable issue. This paper study the concept of intelligence cooperation with reference to Pakistan in the previous history and present perspectives after 9/11 and the Global war against terrorism.

Keywords

Conflict, Security, Intelligence, Cooperation

Introduction

As realists believe the international community is anarchic in the conventional defense approaches, which doesn't imply it is disruptive or disorderly. This interpretation can easily be drawn since realism represents a reality that is dominated by security and conflict. The realistic concept of anarchy does not, however, in itself have anything to do with conflict; it is an ordering theory that specifies that the structure includes individual states without any central control over them. In other terms, sovereignty inherits in states when the world community does not have a higher governing authority. "Government over states" does not exist. The second belief is that states are intrinsically capable of attacking military forces that allow them to harm and even kill one another (Mohiuddin, 2007). And if some states have more military strength than others and are thus more threatening, States are theoretically dangerous to each other. The military force of a state is generally associated with its own arms, although though there were no firearms in such nations, people might also use their foot and hands to target the citizens of a different state. After all, two hands are available to choke it for any neck. Thirdly, governments may never be positive of the intentions of other states. No state, in particular, may be confident that another State would not use its military offensive potential to invade the first state. This does not actually mean the states have hostile motives. Indeed, all the states in the scheme should be predictably benevolent, but this decision cannot be guaranteed because intentions cannot be divinized with (Ahmed & Ali, 1971).

As noted, neither of these assumptions alone mandates that states can be hostile against one another as a general law. It is always possible to provide a state with aggressive motives, but the only presumption that is similar to all states with a certain motif is that their main purpose is to exist (Kyle, 2017). However, while the five hypotheses are married, they have a strong motivation to States for each other to think offensively. Three main behavior trends result in particular: anxiety, self-help and maximization of control. States fear one another; they look with scepticism at each other and think about the fighting. You expect danger. The countries have no space for confidence. The intensity of terror certainly differs over time and distance but cannot be reduced to a negligible level (DURRANI, 2020). This concern is based on the view that a state which is committed to survival in an environment where states can fight each other and can have the reason to do so must at the very least be wary of and unwilling to trust other states. Add to it the issue of "911" – the lack of a national body to which a threatened state may help – and countries are much more encouraged by terror. In addition, there is no method for prosecuting an aggressor, apart from the potential self-interest of third parties. Although the deterrence of possible aggressors is often challenging, states have enough grounds not to trust other countries and ready themselves to go to battle. Further amplifies the role of terror as a driving factor in global affairs through potential effects that fall prey to violence. States should not deal with each other like an economic marketplace for foreign affairs. The contest between states involves own life (Ahmed & Ali, 1971). Due to the fact that other states are possible risks and that no higher rescue authority exists while calling 911, states cannot rely on anyone for their own safety. Each country continues to see itself as weak and isolated, so it seeks to ensure its own survival. God supports those who support themselves in world relations. This self-help focus should not exclude the formation of partnerships by governments. But partnerships are just fleeting weddings of convenience: today's partners may be the adversary of tomorrow, and tomorrow's enemy may be the coalition partner of tomorrow. In WWII, for instance, the US struggled against Germany and Japan with China and the Soviet Union and shortly afterwards, alliances with West Germany and Japan and China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Dylan & Alexander, 2012). States in the self-help environment practically often behave in line with their own objectives and are not subject to the interests of other States or the interests of the so-called international community.

South Asia is also the world's second most volatile country and the number one in West Asia. Among the world’s major democracies, Pakistan faces the most complex threats and challenges spanning the full spectrum of conflict from nuclear to sub-conventional (Shaikh, 2017). The main geopolitical difficulties in South Asia stem from the continuing conflicts in Afghanistan, on the frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The territorial tensions between India, China, India and Pakistan, have not yet been settled. The rising tide of Left-Wing Extremism and the growing spectre of urban terrorism have also contributed towards visualizing Pakistan’s security environment. But despite Pakistan's protracted exposure to the many threats faced by security institutions, defense preparation is conventional rather than substantive, in particular since its inception (Nicolas, 2014). It has been characterized by reactions to new global circumstances and the hazardous development of single services. But the lack of a well stated national security strategy (NSS). With the absence of weak civil-military ties and the inability to devote funds to modernization on a long-term basis with a forecast USD 100 trillion spending budget for military modernization over the next decade, we already understand that power systems need to be designed to face potential risks and demands on an interconnected tri-service basis.

Examining Intelligence

One of the field experts defines understanding as to the knowledge that has been planned for politicians or other players in government, not publicly accessible or research that is dependent, at least in a section, on that information. It is the usage of knowledge secretly gathered and prepared in an appropriate way to satisfy the needs of lawmakers, which renders intelligence special (Ikenberry & Mearsheimer, 2001). Intelligence activity is a mechanism by which countries, armed forces, businesses and other organizations, in order to ascertain the strengths and actions of their competitors, are collected and evaluated systematically. With such knowledge or intelligence, a company may defend itself against its opponents and take advantage of its opponents. In a wider sense, knowledge relates to some types of material, operations and organizations: Smartness is about knowledge important to the formulation and implementation of policies of a government to further its national security objectives and to address the challenges of real or possible adversaries to those interests. Collection, analysis (evaluation) and distributor (use) of data are the intelligence operations or loop of information. Intelligence is undertaken in five measures, like espionage (Nicolas, 2014). Initially, it is important to understand and provide criteria as to what the policymakers need to know. The second move is to gather the details that you want, which needs to know the location and who can obtain it more effectively. Knowledge may be available through a newspaper or radio or other open-source, or either through the more advanced electronic media, whether through the use of an individual inside the goal area decision-making structure (Aspin, 1981). The third phase is the processing of intelligence, in which the raw data are gathered, analyzed and organized in the appropriate way to respond to the initial query. The fourth stage is to provide the decision-maker with the processed details. For the knowledge to be valuable, it must be delivered in a prompt, precise and clear manner (Davies, 2013). Intelligence is the fifth and critical move. The decision-maker could decide to disregard the data transmitted, which may result in vulnerabilities. In a wider sense, knowledge relates to some types of material, operations and organizations: Intelligence means "intelligence necessary for the development and implementation of government policies to promote their goals as a national defense force and address challenges from real or future adversaries to those interests." ^ collection, analysis (evaluation) and distributor (use) of data are the intelligence operations or loop of information. Intelligence is undertaken in five measures, like espionage (Cline, 1974). In addition, the state cannot eradicate risks for itself, for its residents or for national or foreign companies operating on its territories. 

In the context of national security, the function

of intelligence is to promote the state and its values whilst defending it from threats. This position continues to grow and expand independently of the desires or plans of the participants (Gottfredson, 1997). These questions would continue to be addressed as senior officials and decision-makers emerge. By definition, all these topics would have to be addressed by national security intelligence. In order to find the necessary expertise to meet the problems, the national security intelligence services would therefore have to cross their own operational limits (Djalal, 2003). In that sense, it is impossible to neglect the position of intelligence services since intelligence is essential for the state's survival. Therefore, all democracies have developed, albeit with varying systems, sizes, skills and competencies depending on the state, its needs and its background, at least one intelligence service. While the concept of intelligence is not widely agreed upon, the primary role of intelligence in a democracy is to better perform the government's valid duties. In particular, the object of information is to help policymakers/decision-makers and to support defense and military or operations and organizations, as well as to provide them with information and assistance (Gottfredson, 1997). Those that have the roles of information in society must be seen and gathered, evaluated and disseminated for decision-makers/politicians in various ways, including safety risks, geopolitical hazards, prediction for potential capability, indication and warnings (Hussain, 2008). This often refers to the conception and guidance of some forms of clandestine operation.

Intelligence and Human History

Now let me switch the debate to intelligence to help grasp the relevance not only on an international level but in human history as a whole. Actually, the word 'Intelligence Agency' has no specific meaning, but its activity consists of the collection of intelligence, psychological warfare and counter-intelligence, which have been the key functions of the spy community for decades and is regarded as being the second human profession (Halloran, 1998). In order to facilitate the implementation of the constitution, national security, military and strategic priorities, the intelligence services are responsible for collecting, analyzing and using knowledge (Turner & Thibault, 1982). The more knowledge you have about you, your rivals and even your friends, the more support it helps to develop successful plans and policies which would help you to be higher than your fellow men. The idea of espionage in the period of the Maryann Empire has historically been intensively researched in Kautilya's Arthshastra. Most Indian kings understood that physical might was not an exclusive way to defend the Kingdom and its interests (Johnson, 1992). They began planting spies to penetrate/grow into enemy organizations to provide their commanders and monarchs with intelligence. It is certainly a risky way to guarantee the welfare of a state or monarchy, but it remains equally necessary for any state. There was still a chance of leaking the trustworthy mole's name to the adversary and of using the mole himself against the ruler or monarchy (Halloran, 1998). Therefore, once the embedded agents are detected such that the spy does not continue to be a problem for the establishment and crucial knowledge is not leaking, they can either run away or commit suicide. Such a historical system of information gathering and counter-intelligence is relevant even today, but the process is now made easier due to the extensive use of modern technology. Intelligence services work or decide on 'estimated expectations, which may be incorrect or correct (Davies, 2013). The Agency's primary responsibility after the collection of information is in the refining of information; in this case, the information concerns only the raw content and is refined by people who are not constrained by consistency. The Agencies operate on the basis of intelligence from a range of Intel outlets that may or cannot be trustworthy in nature. In addition, the source material could not be specified (Aspin, 1981). An analysis or decoding mistake may often occur to hamper the work/objectives of the intelligence agency, and therefore, you shouldn't assume that it will always succeed in its goals since the entire intelligence evaluation game is "probability." One has to recognize that the collection of intelligence; espionage, counter-intelligence, and related activities are highly complicated. These functions are inherently tactful (Hussain, 2008). Any political interference that will completely different channel the origins of the agencies can irreversibly trigger the nation harm. There have been several developments since its establishment since the need for intelligence outside sovereign borders. In this subsidiary, unorthodox, counterinsurgency and asymmetrical warfare setting, Nation's enemies are no longer identified. In addition, these rivals believe in shadow warfare, and it is where intelligence forces would challenge and, in all way, overcome their aims. At the turn of the 21st century, George Tenet, the head of the CIA, summarized the principal task of the agency in three words: 'We steal secrets.' “We steal secrets." Allen Dulles, the longest-serving chief of CI A, wrote during the Cold War that intelligence agencies had proven themselves through the course of centuries as well an ideal vehicle for conspiracy’ (Turner & Thibault, 1982).  Muhammad waged twenty-seven fighting and instigated military incursions, thus joining the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula under the banner of Islam. Saur Raman Al Mubarakpuri, perhaps his most widely-read Muslim biographer today, says that the 'Prophet was the world's greatest military chief.' The Hadiths are many examples of how he paid keen attention to intelligence during his militant campaigns. Al Mubarakpuri and other Muslim biographers of Muhammad, however, barely mention his intelligence operations.

In addition, the word protection now has to be defined. There has been a strong degree of consensus inside the foreign amphitheatre, whereby defence means protection from challenges to "acquired principles," but it seems to be a far more controversial issue if these threats occur at the national or international level (Gottfredson, 1997). With regard to national security decision-makers, the basic principles are autonomy, territorial integrity and democratic freedom of the state, and any danger to those values is perceived to pose a challenge to national security. The quest for more protection fostered rivalry between countries. The conventional approach to safety narrowed its focus only to exterior defense. As a result, the need for defense was an endless aspect of the securitization phase at national boundaries. Jean-Jacques Rousseau concluded in the 18th century, "If there's another that's better, the state... still feels vulnerable (Halloran, 1998). Its stability and preservation require it to be stronger than its neighbors. Only at their own cost will it increase, nurture and utilize its strength... because the state's greatness is simply relative, it is compelled to equate itself to that of the others. ...It is becoming small or big, small or solid, depending on whether your neighbor expands or contracts, strengthens or decreases”. Types of invasion, violence and intrusion are likely to pose external risks. Any of these risks may be military in nature (Johnson, 1992). This is a conventional understanding of national security as established more extensively in the realistic approach of foreign affairs. In the conventional security system, the state holds a key position. The countries depend on classical foreign relations research and shape partnerships for the achievement of collective protection under the international system. Without the opportunity to guarantee life, many such principles are fragile in the conventional context of international protection (Schofield, 2011). Protection is arbitrary and not uniformly consistent in its orientations. The subjectiveness of interpretations of threats influences the essence of policies.

In this context, this paper seeks to discuss Pakistan's national security and key position in Pakistani smarts. In addition, the section discusses how intelligence helped political decision-makers in Pakistan to keep them informed of the open plans of foreign powers by means of clandestine operations and where the danger lies. This section of the paper examines how conventional patterns of defense in Pakistan were implemented before the end of the Cold War and 9/11. There is no question that stability and intelligentsia have been crucial factor in deciding the foreign policy of Pakistan (Cline, 1974). For instance, smart tactics and intelligence enable fewer strong states to beat stronger opponents. It contributes eventually to a society in which states are able to lie, steal and use physical force if it lets them take advantage of their rivals. Peace is not likely to break out in this country, whether this definition is described as a condition of tranquillity or reciprocal concord.

With that in mind, the analysis shows the

national security intelligence of Pakistan since the establishment of Pakistan. The Islamabad's intelligence kept defense, foreign, and military departments alive in this anarchic environment, and why the intelligence works cannot be overlooked within the paradigm of national security. Thus, under what external conditions did Pakistan's policymakers incorporate intelligentsia as a nation-building agency.

Intelligence, an Institute in Pakistan

The brain-child of Major General Sir Walter J. Caw thorn, a former top military intelligence officer in the British Indian Army, and Shahid Hamid, well connected Pakistani brigadier, is the Intelligence Services in Pakistan. In Pakistan's new capital with its new establishment, Caw thorn and Hamid soon had to find services, but that's by no means simple because the people swelled significantly after independence as refugees poured into the region in search of homes and employment (Nicolas, 2014). Finally, on Old Victory Street corner and Sir Glulam Husain Hidayatullah Road, a one-story building was found. It was a Spartan furnishing: there was still no office supply, but packaging boxes acted as chairs and tables. Some military agencies were unable to share the inadequate personnel with a rival department in the typically bureaucratic manner (Schofield, 2011). Overall, there has indeed been a sluggish beginning for intelligence. The Joint Intelligence Bureau and the Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB) were born through this agency. The JIB was based on British JIB, developed in 1946 to strengthen British military intelligence by Major General Kenneth Strong. In the armed branches, the JCIB oversaw counter-intelligence activities (Shaikh, 2017). Caw thorn emphasized in discussion with his British counterpart that the JCIB will "enjoy absolute access to and operations of the Civil IB." Indeed, the JCIB took over the duties of the IB in the fight against intelligence in relation to the armed forces so far. Their aim was to find, neutralize and/or double foreign agents; they also held interrogations with Pakistani officers and carried out background checks. This last task did not exactly dedicate ISI to the office frame, and discord has often occurred between JCIB and the contra-intelligence departments (Rizvi, 2014). The army naturally had to investigate it because it had a mole among its ranks (and presumably cover up any embarrassing errors). It was also decided that in situations involving the staff of two or more services, ISI must hold the counter-intelligence supremacy; otherwise, counter-intelligence agencies themselves would be prevalent.

In August of 1948, General Caw thorn requested the Joint Intelligence Committee of the British to assist in the identification of the intelligence officers ready to lead the "political officers in charge of information work." At first, the ISI experienced a lack of technical staff and administrators (Mukherjee, 2017). In reality, Hamid was encircled by a number of talented young officers during that era, such as Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, a knowledgeable scion of a prominent Indian pre-partition family who was captured in North Africa by Germans during the Second World War (Schofield, 2011). Yaqub Khan taught German, Italian, French and Russian during his language studies at POW camp. When Yaqub Khan was moved to ISI in 1948, instead of an expected British nominee, he was named JIB Director. In the last few months of the Kashmir conflict, he was, therefore, head of the ISI research.

Major Mohamed Zahiruddin was another remarkable ISI soldier. He was probably the pick of Caw thorn since, after World War II, Caw thorn had hired him to spy behind Japanese lines in Burma, and they knew each other. Zahiruddin worked bravely for almost 3 years undercover until the Japanese were eventually caught. When in May 1945 Rangoon fell onto the Allies, Caw thorn sent a plane personally to bring home the newly released Zahiruddin known as Agent BACKHAND (Ahmed & Ali, 1971). The former spy chose Pakistan and was appointed Commander of the School of [...]"North Areas and the Ran of Kutch salt marshes to the South. Nevertheless, there is evidence of his ISI assignment becoming irritated. "Shahid Hamid is not believed to make anything of his appointment as head of the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate in Karachi," according to a British paper in November 1948. This report does not explain why Hamid was unhappy but possibly came from serving in a non-combat organization during a war with India in his homeland. He also tackled the dental issues affecting modern

administrative bureaucracies.

Inside a dynamic, under-resourced intelligence world, ISI had to compete hard for their share. The Caw thorn Guidelines were a historical feature of Pakistani intelligence, which in the early years of this nascent institution offered not only simple foundations but systematic techniques (DURRANI, 2020).

Pakistan’s Strategic Interest and Intelligence

To the geopoliticians, geography is the handmaiden of power. To them, and to some political scientists as well, national power is firmly rooted in the geography of the nation (Ikenberry & Mearsheimer, 2001). Under this context, ISI was struggling with its increasing list of tasks and shortage of capital to meet the constant demands of the Kashmir conflict. Shahid Hamid visited ISI HQ in October 1948, where the senior British military officer was in Pakistan. Hamid's observer observed the organization's primitive design, which was noted in a letter to London: "This is only the beginning, and a lot of work needs to be done to change the houses, etc. (Schofield, 2011)." "A UN-brokered truce brought to a halt the first Kashmir war on 1 January 1949, only five months after ISI was established. Both parties were not pleased with the result, which each left only parts of the original condition of Kashmir. Pakistan owned the Azad Kashmir state as well as a small, isolated northern area, while the densely inhabited Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh valleys were held in India (Gosling, 2016).

The Kashmir War has taught Pakistani leaders valuable lessons, such as the need for highly qualified and seasoned covert action/UW specialists. In recruiting and organizing irregular forces, Colonel Akbar Khan was a genius improviser, but he did not have a doctrine, a method, or any mechanism for combating certain kinds of conflict (Khan, 1998). The war often needed information on a wide variety of issues, including local traditions, popular sentiment, Indian military provisions, Indian intentions, and foreign-power perceptions such as America, Britain and the Soviet Union (Mohiuddin, 2007). Finally, the Kashmir war proved that a fruitful resistance effort could only be carried out by trusted allies who understood the geography and by the citizens. Pakistan will strive in future to meet some of these criteria; "other requirements have never been solved. In any event, the civil IB rather than ISI owned a portfolio for a new UW process in Indian Kashmir in the immediate aftermath of the conflict (Nawaz, 2010).

Interestingly, it was taught a short introduction to the Kashmir War by ISI. Knowledge is the key to the effectiveness of every UW plan (Ahmed & Ali, 1971).

Conclusion

Intelligence and the ability of the opponent are a big obstacle, but UW practitioners will need knowledge on tribes or related social classes in the target region, including their representatives, feuds and local history. Furthermore, Pakistani leaders needed predictive analyzes that could help them understand how significant third parties such as the US and China will react to an uprising against India, supported by Pakistan. In reality, ISI lacked sophisticated agents and equipment from the beginning. After all, it was a startup from a fallen empire and lacked a skilled frame, operational funds and engineering capital (Mukherjee, 2017). The Joint Signals Intelligence Bureau, which was officially subordinated to ISI in1949, was able to detect wirelessly but potentially less since the British carried the decryption. Finally, though with irony, ISI wanted desperately: prompt, accurate and applicable intelligence, which was what, made it its raison d'être. Good operations in HUMINT entail big time and capital commitments, not to mention senior case officers. In certain markets, technical monitoring equipment was "accessible, but trained employees needed to be set up, operated and maintained (Nawaz, 2010). So, where else does a new intelligence service get information? The Pakistanis were answered with their colonial leaders, the British, who had recently retired. Pakistan was a dominion of the British Commonwealth; it established a JIB that expected the participation of a Commons-wide intelligence network; and it invited the British to appoint the Director of the JCIB (Rizvi, 2014). The ISI's attitude to United Kingdom intelligence agencies was not totally out of line. Pakistan, finally, was the owner of Major General Bill Caw thorn, a man of literal British Imperial wisdom.

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