The Impact of External Support on Insurgency
Insurgency is an organized struggle to overthrow an existing government. External support has played an important role in the success and failure of insurgencies. Insurgencies externally supported both militarily and financially lasted long and succeeded. In contrast, many insurgencies failed, lacking external support. The existing literature has discussed how external support contributes to the success and failure of insurgencies. This study, however, discusses the external support to counter insurgents, not insurgents and its impact on insurgency in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The article explains that after Pakistan became an ally of the US in the war against terror, it allowed the CIA to undertake targeted operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. After their distrust increased,the US started its drone campaign to target the militants. The drone campaign helped the militants to exploit the innocent killed by drones and attracted more support and recruited more youth against the government.
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Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Drones, External Support, Escalation
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(1) Alamgir Khan
Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Swabi, KP, Pakistan.
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Cite this article
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APA : Khan, A. (2021). The Impact of External Support on Insurgency. Global Political Review, VI(II), 131 - 138. https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2021(VI-II).15
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CHICAGO : Khan, Alamgir. 2021. "The Impact of External Support on Insurgency." Global Political Review, VI (II): 131 - 138 doi: 10.31703/gpr.2021(VI-II).15
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HARVARD : KHAN, A. 2021. The Impact of External Support on Insurgency. Global Political Review, VI, 131 - 138.
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MHRA : Khan, Alamgir. 2021. "The Impact of External Support on Insurgency." Global Political Review, VI: 131 - 138
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MLA : Khan, Alamgir. "The Impact of External Support on Insurgency." Global Political Review, VI.II (2021): 131 - 138 Print.
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OXFORD : Khan, Alamgir (2021), "The Impact of External Support on Insurgency", Global Political Review, VI (II), 131 - 138
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TURABIAN : Khan, Alamgir. "The Impact of External Support on Insurgency." Global Political Review VI, no. II (2021): 131 - 138. https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2021(VI-II).15