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THE IMPACT OF ABUSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM ON DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

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06 Pages : 46-54

http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2020(V-I).06      10.31703/gpr.2020(V-I).06      Published : Mar 2020

The Impact of Abusive Constitutionalism on Democracy in Pakistan

Abstract

    This research concerns the constitutional development in Pakistan with a specific reference to 21st Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan. It is widely perceived among scholarly and semi-scholarly circles that the tendency of militarys direct intervention in politics; toppling democratically elected government has been declined for the last many decades across the world. According to the new trends, military interferes in the state affairs through indirect means. One of the indirect means includes abusive constitutionalism that involves constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement as mechanisms for constitutional change. The paper explores whether 21st Amendment to Constitution of Pakistan was an abusive constitutionalism that really empowered military to get a strong hold on key policy making areas of national interest during the democratic rule. The research concludes that the 21st Amendment was an abusive constitutionalism as it curtailed civil liberties and fundamental rights of the citizens and hence undermined democracy in Pakistan.

    Pakistan, 21st Amendment, Abusive constitutionalism, Democracy, Civil liberties.

    (1) Husnul Amin
    Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Islamabad, Pakistan.
    (2) Shafiq Qurban
    Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Rawalpindi Law College, Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan.
    (3) Maryam Siddiqa
    Lecturer, IRD, International Islamic University Islamabad, pakistan.
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Cite this article

APA

CHICAGO

    CHICAGO : Amin, Husnul, Shafiq Qurban, and Maryam Siddiqa. 2020. "The Impact of Abusive Constitutionalism on Democracy in Pakistan." Global Political Review, V (I): 46-54 doi: 10.31703/gpr.2020(V-I).06

HARVARD

    HARVARD : AMIN, H., QURBAN, S. & SIDDIQA, M. 2020. The Impact of Abusive Constitutionalism on Democracy in Pakistan. Global Political Review, V, 46-54.

MHRA

    MHRA : Amin, Husnul, Shafiq Qurban, and Maryam Siddiqa. 2020. "The Impact of Abusive Constitutionalism on Democracy in Pakistan." Global Political Review, V: 46-54

MLA

    MLA : Amin, Husnul, Shafiq Qurban, and Maryam Siddiqa. "The Impact of Abusive Constitutionalism on Democracy in Pakistan." Global Political Review, V.I (2020): 46-54 Print.

OXFORD

    OXFORD : Amin, Husnul, Qurban, Shafiq, and Siddiqa, Maryam (2020), "The Impact of Abusive Constitutionalism on Democracy in Pakistan", Global Political Review, V (I), 46-54

TURABIAN

    TURABIAN : Amin, Husnul, Shafiq Qurban, and Maryam Siddiqa. "The Impact of Abusive Constitutionalism on Democracy in Pakistan." Global Political Review V, no. I (2020): 46-54. https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2020(V-I).06