ARTICLE

IMPACT OF CHINAPAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR CPEC ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION IN PAKISTAN

05 Pages : 50-65

http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2021(VI-I).05      10.31703/gpr.2021(VI-I).05      Published : Mar 2021

Impact of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on National Development and Integration in Pakistan

    Islam This research focuses on the impact of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on the national development and societal integration in Pakistan. Substantial literature is available on the geo-political and geo-economics of CPEC; however, a literature gap exists on the interplay of the domestic politics of Pakistan and the CPEC. I want to explore the intrinsic linkage of federal and provincial disputes, which influence the implementation of CPEC and how such dialectic relationship is affecting nation-building and societal integration in Pakistan. The central argument I want to build is that how such a mega-investment project to the tune of US$ 62 billion, unprecedented in Pakistan's history at the most critical times of economy and energy crisis, is creating inter-provincial disharmony and polarizing the masses. In answering this question, the articles examine multiple standpoints in Pakistan and present critical inquiry of the impact of domestic politics on the CPEC, nation-building and societal integration by applying the theoretical lens of nation-building and societal integration.

    CPEC, National Development, National Integration, Disharmony
    (1) Shabnam Gul
    Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Lahore College for Women University, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan.
    (2) Waseem Ishaque
    Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Islamabad, Pakistan.
    (3) Muhammad Faizan Asghar
    MPhil, Peace & Counter Terrorism Studies, Minhaj University Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan.
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Cite this article

    APA : Gul, S., Ishaque, W., & Asghar, M. F. (2021). Impact of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on National Development and Integration in Pakistan. Global Political Review, VI(I), 50-65. https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2021(VI-I).05
    CHICAGO : Gul, Shabnam, Waseem Ishaque, and Muhammad Faizan Asghar. 2021. "Impact of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on National Development and Integration in Pakistan." Global Political Review, VI (I): 50-65 doi: 10.31703/gpr.2021(VI-I).05
    HARVARD : GUL, S., ISHAQUE, W. & ASGHAR, M. F. 2021. Impact of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on National Development and Integration in Pakistan. Global Political Review, VI, 50-65.
    MHRA : Gul, Shabnam, Waseem Ishaque, and Muhammad Faizan Asghar. 2021. "Impact of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on National Development and Integration in Pakistan." Global Political Review, VI: 50-65
    MLA : Gul, Shabnam, Waseem Ishaque, and Muhammad Faizan Asghar. "Impact of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on National Development and Integration in Pakistan." Global Political Review, VI.I (2021): 50-65 Print.
    OXFORD : Gul, Shabnam, Ishaque, Waseem, and Asghar, Muhammad Faizan (2021), "Impact of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on National Development and Integration in Pakistan", Global Political Review, VI (I), 50-65
    TURABIAN : Gul, Shabnam, Waseem Ishaque, and Muhammad Faizan Asghar. "Impact of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on National Development and Integration in Pakistan." Global Political Review VI, no. I (2021): 50-65. https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2021(VI-I).05